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Abstract 
Civil aviation in Europe is one major area where landmark changes 
have taken place since the late 1980s – the liberalization and 
deregulation of the sector by member states in three “packages” 
in the 1980s has transformed an economic sector historically 
characterized by heavy protectionism, collusion and strong state 
intervention. Today, the European Union’s (EU) aviation sector 
contributes to 2.4% of European GDP and supports 5.1 million 
jobs. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has also 
eagerly taken steps to integrate its aviation markets as part of the 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015. 
 
This background brief chronicles the changes made in the aviation 
sector in Europe through regional integration and examines how 
these changes have affected policymaking in member states, the 
airline industry and consumers. The brief  also examines ASEAN’s 
own effort in the integration of its own aviation sector and, taking 
into account the EU’s strong interest in cooperating with ASEAN 
on transport and civil aviation policy, whether the changes in the 
EU are applicable in the ASEAN context.  
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The European and Southeast 
Asian Single Aviation Markets 
 
DEXTER LEE1 
 
Introduction 
 
Civil aviation in Europe has undergone landmark 
changes since the late 1980s.  Liberalisation and 
deregulation taken to construct a European Single 
Market has transformed an economic sector 
historically characterised by heavy protectionism, 
collusion and strong state intervention. Today, the 
European Union (EU) aviation sector supports 5.1 
million jobs and contributes €365 billion, or 2.4% 
to European GDP (EP Research Service 2014b). 
ASEAN, too, is eager to follow the EU’s example 
and integrate its aviation markets as one of of the 
goals of achieving the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) in 2015. This background brief 
details the changes made in the process of 
integration in the aviation sector in Europe, and 
examines the impact of these changes on 
policymaking in member states, the airline industry 
and European consumers. It also considers the 
applicability of these changes for ASEAN, taking 
into account the EU’s interest in cooperating more 
closely with ASEAN on transport and civil aviation, 
and desire to have a region-to-region civil aviation 
agreement.  
 
History of Post-war Aviation Regulation 
 
The groundwork for the principle of state 
sovereignty in aviation was developed at the 1919 
Paris Convention, where rules for governments to 
address the political difficulties and intricacies 
involved in international aerial navigation were set. 
Governments met again in Chicago in December 
1944 to reaffirm the principles of the Paris 
Convention and to agree on the technical and 
economic aspects of industry regulation. The 
                                                        
1 Policy and Programme Executive, EU Centre in Singapore. 
The author would like to thank Dr Yeo Lay Hwee for her 
comments on the paper. The views expressed in this working 
paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect 
the views of the EU or the EU Centre in Singapore. Any 
shortcomings or errors are solely the author’s. 
development of the post-war framework was not 
without disagreement as European governments 
blocked the United States-led effort for a 
generalised freedom of the air where their carriers 
would be able to pick up passengers in a foreign 
state and set them down in another. At that point 
of time, European countries had a territorial 
advantage in terms of colonial trading posts in Asia 
and Africa, and these countries were reluctant to 
accept liberalisation in fear that the recovery of 
the aviation sector in Europe and their colonies 
would be threatened (Kassim and Stevens 2010: 
22-24). Governments eventually agreed on the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation (also 
known as the Chicago Convention) which was the 
most important of the documents agreed. Key 
developments at the Chicago meeting include:  
 
• The setting up of the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) to manage 
technical rules; 
• The International Air Transport Agreement 
(IATA), or the freedoms of the air, which serves 
as a base document of bilateral air services 
negotiation (see Table A on page 3); 
• The regulation of non-scheduled air services 
(Article 5 of the Chicago Convention); 
• Full discretion by states to regulate domestic 
air services; 
 
(above adapted from Kassim and Stevens 2010: 
24-29). 
 
Despite a restrictive regulatory approach, further 
technological advances, a glut of military aircraft 
and the rise of middle-class spending power   led 
to continued and rapid growth in the commercial 
aviation sector in the post-war world. (Butcher 
2010). The post-war Chicago regulatory regime 
proved to be popular with governments as it 
provided them with far-reaching powers and the 
right to be represented in the skies regardless of 
their size or economic clout. Most importantly, the 
Chicago framework firmly placed states at the 
centre of the commercial aviation sector by 
making them the main actors in the development 
of bilateral air services agreements (ASAs) to 
develop commercial air traffic ties. Airlines – state-
owned and private alike – were heavily reliant on 
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governments in negotiating for their commercial 
opportunities abroad. 
 
Table A: Freedoms of the Air  
Freedom Description Example 
1st the right to fly over a 
foreign country without 
landing 
London - Mexico 
City by a British 
carrier, overflying 
the USA 
2nd the right to refuel or carry 
out maintenance in a 
foreign country without 
embarking or disembarking 
passengers or cargo 
London - Tokyo by a 
British carrier 
company, stopping 
for fuel in 
Anchorage 
3rd the right to fly from one's 
own country to another 
Berlin - Singapore 
by a German carrier 
4th the right to fly from 
another country to one's 
own 
Berlin - London by a 
British carrier 
5th the right to fly between 
two foreign countries on a 
flight originating or ending 
in one's own country 
Dubai - Singapore - 
Melbourne by a 
UAE carrier 
6th the right to fly from a 
foreign country to another 
while stopping in one's 
own country for non-
technical reasons 
Hong Kong - Jakarta 
- Perth by an 
Indonesian carrier 
7th the right to fly between 
two foreign countries while 
not offering flights to one's 
own country 
Amsterdam - Berlin 
by a British carrier 
8th the right to fly inside a 
foreign country, continuing 
to one's own country 
Beijing - Shanghai - 
Bangkok by a Thai 
carrier 
9th the right to fly inside a 
foreign country without 
continuing to one's own 
country (also known as 
“cabotage”) 
Beijing - Shanghai, 
by an Singapore 
carrier 
Adapted from ICAO (n.d) 
 
ASAs designate the airlines that can operate and 
ownership rules, the routes that designated 
airlines are allowed to fly, provisions that relate to 
capacity, the right to approve or reject tariffs, and 
the right to take corrective market action. In 
particular, the typical ASAs between post-war 
European governments involved the designation of 
a single airline from each side, permitted services 
to specific points and granted limited fifth freedom 
rights. Frequency and capacity limits were 
explicitly set by agreement between governments, 
and a compensatory structure was set up through 
pooling arrangements.  
 
It is also worth noting that along with the ASAs, 
national governments were strongly 
interventionist in their approach to commercial 
aviation, providing the means of funding through 
subsidies and the state ownership of shares. In 
many cases, airlines were forced to fly unprofitable 
routes and expenditure by governments on airlines 
was considered as public policy expenditures 
(O’Reilly and Stone Sweet 1998). The main 
beneficiaries of such agreements and policy 
approaches towards aviation were of course 
national flag carriers such as Air France, KLM, 
British Airways and Lufthansa. Unsurprisingly, 
these airlines experienced rapid growth in the 
post-war years and gained a near monopolistic 
market position at the expense of private airlines 
who could not enter the market without 
government permission and assistance.  
 
Within Europe, national governments also agreed 
to form a pan-European aviation body with the 
help of the Council of Europe and the ICAO – the 
European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) was 
formed in 1955 and sought to harmonise civil 
aviation policies and practices amongst its Member 
States (ECAC 2015). National and private airlines 
also played their part in development of the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA), 
formed in Havana in 1945 and open to airlines 
from ICAO member states. IATA is tasked with 
setting the standards of ticketing, appointment 
and payment of travel agents, and the quality of 
inflight services. 
 
Member States’ Conservatism and Changes 
Abroad: 1958-1983 
 
Since the founding of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1958, member states have 
focused attention on creating a common market 
by eliminating borders between member states to 
contribute to the free movement of goods, 
services and labour (Zabokrtsky 2011). When the 
EEC was founded, the pre-existing international 
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system for the aviation sector was based on the 
principle of state sovereignty where access to a 
country’s aviation market is negotiated and 
granted on a bilateral basis. The interests of 
member states in aviation prevailed over the 
interest of the community - states retained the 
power to decide on the extent of market access, 
capacity and tariffs in the aviation sector, and most 
did not attempt to come to an agreement on this 
issue until the late 1970s. Although it was not 
ready to discuss the integration of the aviation 
sector then, the EEC had given special recognition 
to that sector as early as 1958 through Article 80 of 
the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(TEC) which recognised that air transport had a 
special status as compared to road, rail and inland 
waterway transport.  
 
Two events in the 1970s arguably provided the 
impetus for the European Community’s advocacy 
for aviation deregulation in Europe and the 
subsequent development of a European single 
market. The first is a ruling in the European Court 
of Justice in the French Merchant seaman case of 
1974, which gave the European Commission the 
opportunity to place aviation on the Council’s 
agenda and strengthened the hand of those who 
advocate for community action in this economic 
sector (Stanisland 2008: 66-67). As noted by 
Kassim and Stevens (2010), the period after the 
ruling was marked by cooperation between the 
Commission, the Council and the European 
aviation world, leading to the creation of a working 
group on aviation within the Permanent 
Representatives to the Council (COREPER). 
 
The second major development was the 
deregulation of the US aviation industry in 1978 
following the US Airline Deregulation Act2 (Morris 
2013). Although this did not radically undermine 
the Chicago Convention, the new US policy 
heralded a challenge to the restrictionist 
                                                        
2 The bilateral aspect of the US Airline Deregulation Act 
allowed for multiple designations of airlines to operate 
abroad, the right for US carriers to enjoy access to any point 
in the territory of a bilateral partner, further fifth freedom 
rights with only some restrictions, open access for charter 
services and the abolishment of government control over 
capacity and frequency 
assumptions that governments worldwide had 
based their aviation policies. Supporters of the 
traditionalist system were challenged by the British 
and Dutch governments, consumer groups, 
business representatives and independent airlines 
who wanted the European Community to loosen 
regulatory restrictions, and these champions of 
aviation liberalisation increasingly made their 
voices heard in the ECAC and IATA (Kassim and 
Stevens 2010: 83-84) 
 
As Kassim and Stevens (2010: 84-85) noted, these 
circumstances boosted the European 
Commission’s argument for the deregulation of the 
aviation sector in Europe. The Commission had 
already become more assertive with regards to its 
approach towards the reforms required to make 
the aviation sector more competitive, and it drew 
heavily upon ECAC studies and hearings by experts 
on the US deregulation to support its own 
arguments and proposals in a memorandum in 
1978. The growing support for liberalisation in the 
aviation sector meant that at some point of time in 
the future, national governments had to seriously 
entertain the possibility of turning the idea of a 
single aviation market into reality.  
 
Liberalising the European Aviation Sector: 1983 - 
present 
 
The move towards the European single market in 
aviation began in earnest in 1983 after European 
Council adopted a directive that concerned 
community authorisations for inter-regional air 
services between EC member states. A year later in 
1984, the European Commission published a more 
detailed memorandum based on the ECAC’s 
studies on aviation deregulation, as well as a set of 
proposals that would form the basis of the first of 
three packages or stages of deregulation measures 
(see table B on pages 5-6).  The memorandum 
proposed that governments would be prohibited 
from entering capacity or revenue sharing 
agreements, that a zonal system for fares would be 
introduced, and discrimination would be 
prohibited. The proposal would also give the 
power to the Commission to grant block 
exemptions from anti-trust provisions, thus freeing 
airlines from the need to apply for individual 
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exemptions when engaging in areas such as slot 
allocation and passenger tariffs (Kassim and 
Stevens 2010: 89). 
 
Two of the European Court of Justice’s rulings in 
the 1980s strengthened the Commission’s 
liberalisation agenda. The first was a 1985 ruling in 
which the ECJ upheld a case brought by the 
European Parliament against the Council for its 
“failure to act” in the Common Transport Policy 
more generally. Although the Common Transport 
Policy did not apply directly to air transport, the 
ECJ’s ruling gave the Commission more attention 
and support in its goal to develop a Community 
strategy for aviation (Teasdale & Bainbridge 2012 
and O’Reilly & Stone Sweet 1998). The second is 
the 1986 case Nouvelles Frontieres where the ECJ 
ruled that EC competition law applied to air 
transport, even if it was not automatically included 
in the Common Transport Policy (Staniland 2008: 
79). In this latter case, the Court also highlighted 
the need for a common legal framework to cover 
Community aviation.  
 
It is important to note the pivotal role of the 
member states holding the presidencies of the EU 
between 1986 and 1987 in driving aviation sector 
liberalisation. As Kassim and Stevens (2010: 97-98) 
noted, conservatism prevailed among member 
states despite the ECJ’s rulings. France and 
Germany rejected the Commission’s 1984 
memorandum and proposed a more conservative 
approach to setting fares and route capacity. This 
in turn led to the UK to respond with an 
uncompromising liberal counterproposal that 
argued for the freedom for airlines to set tariffs 
and capacity according to their own commercial 
judgment. The UK’s Presidency of July to 
December 1986 eventually saw further 
compromises in liberalisation as well as continued 
divisions among member states, but two 
important outcomes were achieved: UK firmly 
placed aviation liberalisation at the top of the 
agenda, and the European Commission was 
persuaded by these events to put together a 
package that would be broadly acceptable to all 
member states. 
 
The crucial breakthrough came during the 
Belgium’s Presidency of the Council in January to 
June 1987, putting the liberalisation agenda on its 
top priority. The Presidency also dealt well with 
the Commission’s renewed threats to withdraw its 
proposals and proceed with legal action by 
convincing several state-owned airlines to 
cooperate with the Commission. A deal in principle 
for the first of three packages of aviation 
liberalisation was finally struck by the end of June 
1987 after all member states were able to agree 
on the reduction of fares, market shares, cabotage 
and the rules of governance. An ongoing dispute 
between Spain and UK over Gibraltar pushed back 
the final adoption of the first package to December 
1987 (Kassim and Stevens 2010: 99-102). At the 
time of its adoption, the first package reduced fare 
restrictions and granted airlines additional 
flexibility for cooperation within existing 
agreements. 
 
Table B: The Three Packages (1987 – 1992, 
effective until 2008) 
Packages Contents of Package 
First Package 
(1987) 
• Fare restrictions were reduced  
• Carriers were also given additional 
flexibility for cooperation within 
the limits of existing air service 
agreements. 
 
Relevant laws: 
• Council Regulations 3975/87 and 
3976/87 laid down the procedure 
of applying competition rules to 
undertakings and to certain 
categories of agreements and 
concerted practices in the air 
transport sector 
•  Council Directives 601/87 and 
602/87 respectively 
 
Second 
Package 
(1990) 
• All European airlines allowed 
carrying passengers to and from 
their home countries to other EU 
Member States (3rd and 4th 
freedoms). 
• Airlines granted 5th freedom flights, 
i.e. intra-European flights with 
stop-over in a third country and 
the right to pick-up and drop-off 
passengers during the stopover 
• Fare and capacity restrictions were 
further abolished. 
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Relevant Regulations: 
• Council Regulation 2343/90 on 
market access 
 
• Regulation 2342/90 on air fares and 
capacity 
• Regulation 2344/90 on the 
application of the TEC to certain 
categories of concerted practice 
 
Third Package 
(1992) 
 
• Common licensing of carriers & 
freedom of access to the market- 
all carriers holding a community 
license were allowed to serve any 
international route within the 
European Union. 
• Carriers given almost full freedom to 
set fares subject to safeguards 
against unfair pricing 
• In 1997, all carriers holding a 
community license were given the 
right of cabotage (i.e. the right to 
operate domestic routes within the 
whole of the EU). 
 
Relevant regulations: 
 
• Regulation 2407/92 governed the 
licensing of airlines/air carriers 
• Regulation 2408/92 set out the rules 
on access for Community air 
carriers to intra-Community air 
routes and public service 
obligations (PSOs) for small and 
disadvantaged communities in the 
Community 
• Regulation 2409/92 set out further 
rules on fares and rates for air 
services  
• Regulations 2410/92 and 2411/92 
amended and updated Regulations 
3875/87/EEC and 3976/87 EEC, 
bringing them into line with the 
changes agreed in the third 
package 
 
 
Two further packages completed the Single 
Aviation Market in Europe. The negotiation of the 
second package was beset by resistance from 
member states such as Denmark, Greece and 
Portugal as well as calls for harmonisation of 
competition from the French and German 
governments – in fact, France led the opposition to 
further liberalisation during its presidency of the 
Council from July to December 1989 and gave 
more airtime to the arguments of the cautious 
majority. Nevertheless, the liberal activism within 
the Commission, the UK and Dutch governments 
towards the opening of markets and a last-minute 
change in France’s position due to internal political 
pressures within the French administration 
eventually won the day. After the second package 
was concluded, airlines gained the right to carry 
passengers to and from their home countries to 
other EU member states and benefitted from 
further abolishment of fare and capacity 
restrictions (Kassim and Stevens 2010).  
 
In terms of the third package, the Council and the 
Commission were pre-committed to further 
liberalisation and an agreement was reached 
during the Portuguese Presidency. The Council and 
Commission both presented radical proposals such 
as the liberalisation of fare setting and the 
abolishment of the nationality clause respectively. 
When implemented, all EU carriers holding a 
community license were given the full freedom to 
set fares and capacity. Furthermore, they were 
allowed to operate domestic routes within the 
whole of the Community from 1997 onwards 
(Kassim and Stevens 2010). These three packages 
were reviewed by the European Commission from 
2003-2008, and after extensive consultative input 
from the European Parliament and various 
stakeholders, provisions for environmental 
protection were added and the packages were 
combined as Regulation 1008/2008 in September 
2008. 
 
The EU also expanded and secured the single 
aviation market within its own neighbourhood by 
signing up non-EU member states Norway, Iceland 
and Switzerland to aviation rules under the 1994 
agreement that created the European Economic 
Area (EEA). Furthermore, the EU has more or less 
secured its competence to act in determining not 
just EU aviation policy but bilateral agreements 
with other third parties as well. An ECJ decision in 
a complaint by the Commission against member 
states’ negotiating ASAs with the US stopped short 
of recognising that the Commission had exclusive 
competence in the field of aviation, but 
nevertheless ruled that negotiations of ASAs 
between EU member states and third parties were 
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discriminatory towards airlines. Essentially, this 
strengthened the mandate of the Commission to 
negotiate open skies agreement with third 
countries and swept aside the state-centric 
bilateral basis for air services negotiations (Kassim 
and Stevens 2010: 169-170).  
 
Present Regulation of the Single Aviation 
Market in Europe 
 
The aviation sector in Europe has changed rapidly 
since the European Commission’s liberal 
memorandum in 1984, and a host of treaty 
mechanisms and regulatory tools ensure the 
smooth running of the aviation sector in Europe. 
The regulation of the single aviation market is the 
responsibility of the European Commission’s 
transport and competition departments, DG TREN 
(Transport) and DG COMP (Competition). The 
Commission is responsible for administering a 
growing body of law in the single aviation sector, 
and it is able to exercise its formal powers with 
regards to the economics, competition and state 
aid through a range of treaty provisions and 
regulations that have been developed for the 
Single Market in Europe or specifically for the 
aviation sector.  
 
In terms of the legal aspects of regulating the 
single aviation market, Regulation 1008/2008 (see 
Table C on the right) has combined the important 
aspects of legal rights from the previous packages - 
market access to routes and the setting of airfares 
is comprehensively covered under this regulation, 
alongside the obligation for member states to 
grant a license to any airline that meets the criteria 
laid down in the regulations. There are also 
numerous competition rules to prevent the 
distortion and/or restriction of competition, as 
well as regulations that concern the regulation of 
mergers and acquisitions such as in the case of the 
Air France-KLM merger in 2004. Last but not least, 
the liberalisation of the aviation market meant 
that member states’ governments cannot freely 
offer financial aid to national flag carriers. Rules to 
ensure EU state aid to airports and airlines were 
recently updated in April 2014, and the 
Commission can rely on Article 107 as the basis for 
acting against state aid that distorts competition in 
the aviation market. 
 
Table C: Current Regulations and Treaty Articles 
concerning the SAM 
Area Specific 
Legislation 
Contents 
Licensing Regulation 
1008/2008 
Chapter II, 
Articles 3-14 
Requires member states 
to grant a license to any 
airline that meets the 
four criteria laid down in 
the regulations. 
 
Market 
Access 
Regulation 
1008/2008 
Chapter IV, 
Articles 22-24 
 
 
Regulation 
1008/2008 
Chapter II, 
Articles 15-21. 
Enshrines the right for 
Community air carriers 
to freely set airfares. 
 
Ensures access to routes, 
defines public service 
obligations (PSOs) 
Governments can limit 
or refuse the exercise of 
traffic rights by another 
community airline, such 
as protecting services to 
small communities under 
PSOs. 
 
Competition Regulation 
487/2009 and 
Regulation 
411/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulation 
139/2004 
 
 
 
Regulation 
1008/2008 
Chapter II, Article 
16-18 
 
These two regulations 
concern the application 
of Article 101(3) TFEU to 
certain categories of 
agreements and 
concerted practices in 
the air transport sector, 
as well as individual and 
block exemptions. 
 
Empowers the council to 
rule on the validity of 
mergers in the aviation 
sector. 
 
Sets out the general 
conditions and criteria 
for awarding a PSO in 
order to minimise 
distortion of competition 
State Aid TFEU Article 107 
(1-3) 
 
 
Provides that state aid is 
incompatible with the 
common market if it 
distorts competition, 
unless it qualifies for 
exemptions under the 
provisions of Article 
107(2) or (3) 
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Impact of Single Aviation Market on Aviation 
Services and Domestic Policy Making in the EU 
 
The regulatory regime governing the creation of 
the single aviation market as well as market access 
and competition rules have been credited for the 
success in the liberalisation of the aviation sector. 
A European airline establishing its base of 
operations within the EU can look forward to non-
discriminatory air carrier licensing, full market 
access with no capacity restrictions, the right to 
operate domestic routes in any EU member states 
and any route within the EU, and the freedom to 
set fares. National governments are not allowed to 
interfere in their decisions, nor are they allowed to 
provide state aid to their competitors. 
Commercials incentives, then, are the primary 
consideration for airlines to open or close a route, 
to add or reduce capacity, and to increase or 
reduce fares.  
 
Protectionism has been drastically reduced since 
the 1990s as European governments gradually 
adjusted their policies towards the liberalisation of 
the aviation market. Today, member states’ 
governments no longer make aviation policies 
independently but have to share the decisional 
authority with each other and with EU institutions. 
National actors are now subsumed within a wider, 
more diffuse system of decision making at the EU 
level, which includes the member states’, the 
European Commission, the European Parliament 
and special interest groups at the EU level. 
Traditional state-flag carrier links are eroded – 
with some national airlines being privatised - and 
many member states have responded to the EU 
regime and internal factors by shifting their 
policymaking agenda to accommodate the 
interests of other private airlines within their 
borders (Kassim and Stevens 2010: 241-245).  
 
The main beneficiaries of the single aviation 
market are the independent low-cost carriers 
(LCCs) that have successfully carved out a blue 
ocean low-fares market in the Europe. The launch 
of British low-cost airline EasyJet’s international 
routes to European destinations in 1996, as well as 
the expansion of Irish airline Ryanair into the EU 
market, led the way for greater competition 
between private airlines and flag carriers (Miller 
2013). Thanks to the freedom to fly from any point 
to another in the EU, these budget  airlines would 
rapidly expand in the new millennium alongside 
other privately owned low-cost aspirants such as 
Air Berlin, Norwegian Air Shuttle and Wizz Air. The 
enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007 gave 
these carriers more opportunities to tap into new 
markets in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Undoubtedly, European low-cost airlines have 
been instrumental in expanding the aviation 
market in Europe - Ryanair and Easyjet now 
command 31% and 21% of the European low cost 
market respectively, and the sector itself 
constitutes 26% of the total market share for air 
services in the EU (EP Research Service 2014).  
 
Although the aviation services market has grown, 
national airlines – big and small – have suffered 
from the rise of Europe-wide (LCCs) and Gulf 
carriers on intercontinental routes. In fact, many 
smaller national airlines have gone into the red.  In 
order to survive within the new regulatory regime, 
airlines have to make major attempts to 
consolidate their domestic and Europe-wide 
positions through imitating the low cost model, 
partnerships, and acquisitions and mergers with 
other European airlines to reduce cost and 
increase revenues. Major airline groups such as Air 
France-KLM, Lufthansa-Austrian-Swiss and British 
Airways-Iberia have emerged as a result of the 
changes in the aviation environment in Europe, 
while smaller airlines such as Czech Airlines have 
attracted investment capital from abroad (Wall 
2013 and Rousek 2014). It is little wonder that in 
this tough competitive environment national flag 
carriers have also entered the low-cost market 
with brands such as Germanwings, Vueling and 
Transavia to win a share in this market segment. 
This unfortunately comes at the cost of layoffs in 
the parent groups to improve financial returns 
(Bachman 2014).  
 
All in all, the result of aviation sector liberalisation 
is that the market for air travel, in particular the 
low-cost sector, has expanded rapidly. The number 
of intra-EU routes has increased by 250% between 
1992 and 2011, while intra-EU routes with more 
than two carriers have increased by 420% in the 
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same time frame (European Commission 2011). 
Low-cost airline capacity has grown at an average 
rate of 14% per year against the 1% average 
annual growth rate of legacy flag carriers in that 
time – the low cost market has tripled from below 
10 million seats to over 30 million in 2013, with the 
overall market volume in the legacy segment 
increasing by only 2.8 million seats, or less than 
311,000 seats per year (OAG 2013). There has also 
been significant increase in passengers using 
secondary and regional airports as low-cost airlines 
continue to create more hubs, and legacy carriers 
have been forced to adapt by reducing their fares 
and increasing efficiency (Vidović et al 2013 and EP 
Research Service 2014a). There is no doubt that 
the liberalisation of the market has offered more 
choices to consumers in terms of destinations, 
lower fares, and represented a stimulus to 
independent travel and tourism within the EU.  
 
The liberalisation of air services in Europe has also 
led to changes in other areas. First and foremost, 
regional and secondary airports have benefited 
from the boom with the inflow of passengers, and 
this has meant that member states and the 
European Commission had to consider the 
allocation of airport slots3 as well as other areas 
such as liberalisation in ground handling services. 
Secondly, the increase in flights and aircraft has led 
the European Parliament and Council to launch the 
Single European Sky (SES) and Single European Sky 
II (SES II) to work towards the smooth integration 
of European airspace. Last but not least, the 
European Council and Parliament have also looked 
into the integration of air safety standards with the 
establishment of the European Aviation Safety 
Agency (EASA) in 2002, as well as the rights 
concerning the assistance and compensation of 
passengers due to inconveniences in scheduled air 
transport (Zabokrtsky 2011: 167-177). The 
European Parliament Research Service (2014b) has 
however, identified shortcomings with regards to a 
lack of consistency with the Single European Sky 
                                                        
3  Regulation 95/93/EEC, as amended by Regulation 
894/2002/EC and 793/2004/EC, came into effect in 1993 and 
dealt with rights of airlines to hold slots in different seasons, 
the recognition of secondary rules established by IATA with 
regards to slots and retaining, and new slot demands and 
requirements for airlines 
and inefficiency in slot allocations - these must be 
addressed in order for the cost and social benefits 
of the Single Market in Aviation to be fully realised. 
 
ASEAN and the push towards the Single 
Aviation Market (ASAM) 
 
Following the example of the EU, the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) aims to 
integrate the various national aviation markets 
into an ASEAN Single Aviation Market (ASAM) by 
the end of 2015. The drive to create ASAM began 
in 1996 with a memorandum on air services policy4 
and it has yielded two multilateral agreements in 
2009 and 2011 which have redefined 3rd, 4th and 
5th freedom rights in the region as well as 
restrictions on ownership. However, the road to 
complete ASAM has not been smooth. ASAM 
requires the ratification of a minimum of three 
states before it can enter into force, and it is only 
among those states that ASAM will apply. ASAM 
also contains restrictions for certain host countries 
that do not exist in the EU’s Single Aviation market 
or even in other international air agreements, and 
the development of ASAM has been driven solely 
by governments of member states and not by the 
ASEAN Secretariat. This is understandable since 
ASEAN is inter-governmental and the Secretariat 
does not wield any policy making power, unlike the 
European Commission which has the power to 
initiate policies. 
 
The move towards the liberalisation of aviation 
markets in ASEAN is recent. The initial push 
towards the liberalisation of the aviation sector in 
1995 only dealt with soft rights such as marketing 
and reservation systems, while hard rights such as 
traffic and capacity setting were excluded. ASEAN 
governments later expressed their desire in the 
1996 Ministerial Understanding on ASEAN co-
operation in Aviation to develop a competitive air 
services policy and the vision of an ASEAN single 
aviation market. In fact, ASAM was identified as a 
key area for development when ASEAN member 
                                                        
4 The Ministerial Understanding on ASEAN co-operation in 
aviation outlined the need to develop a competitive air 
services policy with a view of creating the ASEAN single 
aviation market, the liberalisation of the aviation market in 
the region 
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states came together at the 13th ASEAN Summit to 
adopt the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 
Blueprint which serves as a master plan for limited 
economic integration by the end of 2015 (Severino 
2009). The AEC Blueprint sparked further 
negotiations on aviation liberalisation, and in 2009 
the Multilateral Agreement of Air Services (MAAS) 
instituted unlimited 3rd, 4th and 5th freedom rights 
between ASEAN capital cities. The Multilateral 
Agreement for the Full Liberalisation of Air Services 
(MAFLPAS) extended this right to all 72 
international airports across ASEAN. Further to this, 
enhanced ownership rules were introduced to 
allow ASEAN based shareholders to own up to 70% 
of ASEAN based airlines, up from the current 40-
49% limit.  
 
Table D: ASEAN Liberalisation Agreements 
Multilateral 
Agreements   
Contents of Agreement 
2009 Multilateral 
Agreement of Air 
Services (MAAS) 
Unlimited 3rd/4th/5th freedoms 
between and among the 10 ASEAN 
capital cities 
(break down into protocols) 
2010 Multilateral 
Agreement for the 
Full Liberalisation of 
Air Services 
(MAFLPAS) 
Unlimited 3rd/4th/5th freedoms 
between and among the other cities 
with international airports 
(break down into protocols) 
 
 
However, the implementation of ASEAN’s vision of 
open skies has been constantly undermined by 
disjointed liberalisation strategies. Firstly, ASEAN 
has engaged in ASA negotiations also with its East 
Asian neighbours, and in 2010 it successfully inked 
the ASEAN-China Air Transport Agreement – 
ACATA – which provided carriers with unlimited 
third and fourth freedom rights to fly from any 
international airport within ASEAN to any 
international airport within China. However, 
ACATA gives Chinese carriers an unfair advantage 
over ASEAN carriers – Chinese airlines are now 
able to create multiple air hubs and enhance 
connectivity at the expense of Southeast Asia’s 
major airlines (Tan 2013 and Sim 2013). This, of 
course, has caused some concern among airlines 
such as AirAsia, worried about the effects of lop-
sided competition on the Southeast Asian aviation 
market (Koh 2014). 
 
Secondly, some ASEAN member states have been 
active in concluding open skies and aviation 
services agreements with other third parties ahead 
of a bloc-wide aviation services agreement. For 
example, Singapore and Brunei chose to enter into 
an open skies agreement with some members of 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 
such as New Zealand, ahead of enhancing 
connectivity between their immediate neighbours 
(Government of New Zealand n.d.). Singapore and 
Brunei had also concluded with Thailand a highly 
advantageous open skies agreement in December 
2004 that granted Singapore and Thai carriers’ 
unlimited 1st to 6th freedom rights (Kyodo News 
2004). So far, this has led Singapore based airlines 
such as Jetstar Asia and Scoot to take advantage of 
using Thai airports as intermediate stops to other 
destinations in North Asia in order to sell more 
seats. 
 
Thirdly, the full implementation of ASAM has been 
slowed by the varying levels of support among 
member countries to fully ratify the two 
agreements. Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam can be 
considered as strong supporters of liberalisation as 
they have fully ratified MAAS and MAFLPAS, while 
partial supporters of ASAM are Laos, Cambodia 
and the Philippines - the former two having ratified 
only MAAS 5  while the latter has only ratified 
MAFLPAS (Aziz and Wattanawong 2013). However, 
Indonesia has not fully ratified MAAS and has 
refused to ratify MAFLPAS. Instead, Indonesia 
seems to be selective with signing ASAs with 
ASEAN countries such as Singapore (CAPA 2013 
and Citrinot 2013). While Laos’ and Cambodia’s 
reluctance to ratify MAFLPAS can be attributed to 
their weak aviation infrastructure, Indonesia’s 
protectionist attitude may be attributed to a 
geographic imbalance in the number of entry 
points that it must offer to non-Indonesian airlines 
after ratification of MAFLPAS – for example, 
Singapore and Brunei can only offer one point of 
access, the Philippines 10, while Indonesia has to 
offer 29 international airports as entry points. 
Through bilateral agreements, Indonesia is able to 
                                                        
5 Indonesia, Cambodia and Laos have yet to ratify MAFLPAS 
protocols 1 and 2, which offer fourth and fifth freedoms 
between secondary cities. 
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restrict foreign carriers from operating into Jakarta, 
Surabaya, Medan, Makassar and Bali (Tan 2014a 
and Meszaros 2014). 
 
Arguably, the slow pace of aviation services 
integration can also be attributed to the political 
context of intergovernmental cooperation in 
ASEAN.  The bloc’s member states were reluctant 
to give up their national sovereignty, preferring to 
engage with each other through “the ASEAN Way” 
where inter-governmental consensus and 
consultation rather than taking a legalistic, formal  
approach is the norm (Centre for International Law 
2009). When the idea of economic cooperation 
and AFTA was agreed to in 1992, ASEAN 
governments included into the agreement the 
right to withhold the implementation of intra-
ASEAN economic arrangements if the states are 
not ready, owing to the unequal level of 
development between the countries in ASEAN. In 
terms of aviation policy, ASEAN governments 
continue with the principle of state sovereignty vis-
à-vis the Chicago Convention in addition to the 
existing ASEAN framework of   consultation and 
consensus.  
 
The rush by ASEAN and member states to 
complete external connectivity before internal 
connectivity therefore raises questions about its 
member states’ actual motivations towards ASAM. 
ASEAN has attempted to address this issue with 
the Memorandum of Understanding on the 
ASEAN’s Air Service Engagement with Dialogue 
Partners in November 2010 to ensure that ASEAN-
wide ASAs will be approved before ASAs between 
ASEAN and its dialogue partners, but so far only 
Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam have 
ratified this document (Tan 2014a). A lack of action 
on the part of member states on securing internal 
integration of the aviation services market in terms 
of the two agreements (MAAS & MATFLAS) and 7th, 
8th and 9th freedom rights spells great implications 
for the future of aviation in the region. As each 
country continues to liberalise external 
connectivity with other partners such as the EU, 
Southeast Asian carriers may be faced with a long 
term disadvantage from airlines that can operate 
flights from different points in their home 
countries or regions just like what their 
counterparts from China currently enjoy, but 
without having to face much competition from 
ASEAN carriers (Tan 2014b).  
 
Airlines and the push for ASEAN open skies 
 
Despite the slow pace of air services liberalisation, 
aviation markets in ASEAN member states have 
experienced strong growth and airlines have been 
finding ways to grow despite this. Intra-ASEAN 
travel has grown strongly at a compounded annual 
rate of 13% from 2009-2013, and some analysts 
have projected an annual growth rate of 8% for the 
next two decades (Ministry of Transport 2015). 
Most attributed this growth to the growing middle 
class, but airlines have also thrived here thanks to 
the adoption of a blue ocean strategy 6  and 
creative ownership rules via “institutional 
arbitrage 7 ”. Malaysian low-cost airline group 
AirAsia Berhad – a former government owned 
airline that was revived by entrepreneur Tony 
Fernandes – has defied the odds to become the 
foremost intra-ASEAN airline with 120 destinations 
and a fleet of 184 aircraft (Chin: 99). Setting up 
operations in Kuala Lumpur in 2002, the low-cost 
airline later expanded into Thailand through a joint 
venture with Shin Corporation in 2004 and added 
an Indonesian subsidiary in 2005. The airline later 
ventured into the Philippine market with 
Philippines AirAsia in 2012 and with AirAsia Zest in 
2013 when slot restrictions were freed at Manila 
International Airport, as well as long-haul 
operations through its AirAsiaX subsidiaries (Chin: 
99). In these cases, the AirAsia Group entered each 
                                                        
6  A blue ocean strategy is the simultaneous pursuit of 
differentiation and low cost to open up a new market space 
and create new demand. This concept was coined in 2005 by 
INSEAD academics W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne in a 
book entitled “Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create 
Uncontested Market Space and Make Competition 
Irrelevant”. 
7 Institutional arbitrage in the airline industry involves cases 
where investors who are nationals of foreign states enter 
into joint ventures with domestic companies or nationals of 
target country. Foreign investors take care to maintain the 
maximum foreign ownership levels allowed by the domestic 
investment of air transport of the target country in order to 
organize a new airline. Since the new airline is considered a 
registered company in the target country, it is entitled to the 
traffic rights of the target country (Dy 2014:24) 
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market as minority shareholders in order to skirt 
around ownership restrictions. 
 
Another major airline that has expanded at a rapid 
pace is Indonesia’s Lion Air, which has followed 
AirAsia’s strategy of joint partnerships in Thailand 
and Malaysia with Thai LionAir and Malindo Air – 
the Lion Air group now boasts a fleet of 182 
aircraft and flies to 120 destinations within 
Southeast Asia (Elista 2015 and CAPA 2014c). 
Other airlines such as Singapore-based Jetstar Asia 
and Tigerair have attempted to penetrate and 
capture a share of the low-cost aviation market in 
ASEAN not just with flights to other ASEAN 
destinations but with similar joint partnerships as 
AirAsia. Nevertheless, results have been mixed for 
these airline groups: Tigerair’s joint partnerships in 
Indonesia and the Philippines have so far ended in 
failure, while its counterpart Jetstar Asia has seen 
moderate success in Vietnam’s domestic and 
international markets (CAPA 2014b). National 
carriers have also benefited from the liberalisation 
of air rights between capital cities by adding more 
flights, but almost none are active in launching 
flights between secondary cities due to the 
competitive advantage of budget airlines. 
 
The successful examples of AirAsia and LionAir 
Groups mentioned above fly in the face of the 
difficult regulatory environment that airlines 
operate in. Unlike the EU’s open skies where 
community carriers have the freedom to set up 
bases wherever they deem fit, ASEAN based 
airlines have to rely on joint partnerships with 
companies in countries they wish to expand their 
operations due to the restrictions in the freedoms 
of the air in the region (Tan 2014a). Establishing 
subsidiaries such as ThaiAirAsia or Malindo Air 
have allowed the two largest low-cost airline 
groups to not just launch more flights to other 
points in Southeast Asia with fewer restrictions, 
but also, to change how consumers approach air 
travel in Southeast Asia. Low cost carriers now 
account for over half of the seats in Southeast 
Asia’s four largest domestic markets – Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, as well as a 
50 per cent stake in the intra-Southeast Asia 
international market (Nadaraj 2014). They have 
also helped to increase the capacity and boost 
tourism to frontier markets in ASEAN: Myanmar’s 
international seat capacity increased by 77 per 
cent while Cambodia’s three international airports 
(Phnom Penh, Siem Reap and Sihanoukville) have 
attracted 5.1 million passengers in 2013, an 18 
percent increase than in 2012 (Huang 2014). 
 
Undoubtedly, the main beneficiaries of a fully 
liberalised ASAM with unlimited 7th freedom rights 
would be large airline groups in ASEAN. After all, in 
a true single aviation market, entering into joint 
ventures would be unnecessary as all airlines 
would be able to operate freely within the region. 
However, this is far from the truth. For example, 
the LionAir Group along with Indonesian flag 
carrier Garuda Indonesia have significant leverage 
in Indonesian aviation policy and they oppose air 
services liberalisation – Garuda Indonesia itself has 
the authority to coordinate and allocate 
international flights slots in Indonesia’s airports, a 
privilege that is often held by independent slot 
coordination authorities or aviation regulatory 
boards in other ASEAN member states. The 
reluctance of these airlines to see increased 
competition is unsurprising as Indonesia faces a 
geographic imbalance of entry points compared to 
their ASEAN partners (Saraswati and Hanaoka 
2013). This geographic anomaly has shaped the 
way these airlines and the Indonesian government 
view the ASAM, where liberalisation could derail 
attempt by the country’s two largest carriers to 
create aviation hubs at major international airports, 
and by extension, employment opportunities for 
many Indonesians (Meszaros 2014). 
 
The AirAsia Group, however, views ASEAN 
integration in a more positive way and its chairman, 
Tony Fernandes is a firm believer in ASEAN 
integration and has consistently advocated for the 
single aviation market in ASEAN. In fact, the AirAsia 
group had launched their regional headquarters in 
Jakarta in 2012 as part of their AirAsia ASEAN 
growth strategy to take advantage of  the launch 
of ASEAN SAM in 2015, with Fernandes even going 
as far to say that Jakarta is “the future of ASEAN” 
(Chin 2014: 134-136). In the wake of the AirAsia 
Indonesia QZ8501 tragedy in December 2014, 
Fernandes had also called on ASEAN to establish a 
common regulator to streamline a fragmented 
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safety framework and ensure common standards 
for aircrew training in the booming industry 
(Business Times 2015). Unsurprisingly, Indonesia, 
its national airlines and ASEAN do not share the 
same sentiments as Tony Fernandes – although 
AirAsia  is among the largest and more influential 
airlines in Southeast Asia,  its push for liberalisation 
and integration has been hampered by the lack of 
support from ASEAN’s Secretary General and 
active opposition by its rivals in Indonesia. 
Nevertheless, Fernandes has insisted that his goal 
to create an ASEAN community airline remains and 
that he would “rather try and fail than not try at 
all” (Chin 2014: 140). 
 
EU’s Open Skies and ASAM: Comparisons 
and the road forward 
 
There are several takeaways from comparing the 
EU’s successful single aviation market and ASEAN’s 
attempt to create one. Firstly, there is a similarity 
in that governments in both the EU and ASEAN had 
been initially reluctant to create a single aviation 
market because of their desire to protect their 
own airlines from foreign competition. However, 
here is where there is a clear difference in terms of 
institutional capacity in each bloc resulting in 
different outcomes. The EU supranational 
institutions such as the European Commission and 
the ECJ have had a major impact in helping to 
overcome resistance by member states and 
pushing for the creation of the EU’s single aviation 
market. Today, both these institutions help to 
regulate the aviation sector with a comprehensive 
package of legal mechanisms that cover licensing, 
market access and competition, and other pan-
European bodies have been created to regulate 
aviation safety and security.  
 
ASEAN, on the other hand, lacks the kind of 
executive and legislative bodies that the European 
Union has, as it remains a purely inter-
governmental organisation and member states, 
jealously guarding its sovereignty with no intention 
in the foreseeable future to go the EU way. It is 
rather contented to stick to its ASEAN Way, which 
refers to the centrality of consensus building in 
policymaking within the region and reluctance to 
“push its members beyond what they are willing to 
accommodate” (Narine 2002). As mentioned, 
intergovernmental consensus coupled with the 
principle of state sovereignty has meant that the 
regional bloc does not have the institutions or the 
force of law to compel its members to agree to 
aviation liberalisation, nor can it even expose its 
members for non-compliance to whatever that has 
been agreed. Even if ASAM is completed, ASEAN 
would not be able to regulate ASAM because it 
would lack the institutions capable of doing so. 
ASEAN integration, as well as that of ASAM, may 
therefore have to take a different evolutionary 
path than that of the European Union. 
 
Secondly, the importance of leadership in 
supranational policymaking is central to the 
developments of the single aviation markets in 
Europe and Southeast Asia. The intervention of 
certain member states such as the UK and the 
Netherlands in the midst of German and French 
resistance has clearly been an important factor in 
the EU’s march towards a single aviation market, 
and at times, the pivotal role in creating the single 
aviation market has been played by countries that 
have been strong advocates of liberalisation. In the 
case of ASEAN one would expect Indonesia – the 
bloc’s largest and most populous member state – 
to take the lead in economic integration. There are 
some indications that Indonesia has taken the 
leadership role through the promotion of an 
activist agenda for ASEAN during its presidency in 
2011 (Yeo 2013). Yet, Indonesia has had little or no 
interest in accelerating the pace of completing 
ASAM perhaps due in part to its geography and 
size and the context of aviation development in 
Indonesia. Much more can be expected from 
Indonesia, although as the EU case showed, the 
pivotal leadership role does not necessarily need 
to be taken by the largest or richest countries. As 
Dy (2014:27-28) suggests, it can be taken up by 
countries with moral suasion and possibly those 
whose carriers are not seen as a threat by sceptical 
states such as Indonesia and Philippines. 
 
Thirdly, there is a key difference in terms of how 
large and successful pan-bloc airlines have 
developed: as discussed above, airlines such as 
AirAsia and LionAir grew through institutional 
arbitrage, unlike Ryanair and Easyjet which had 
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reaped the benefits of aviation liberalisation in the 
EU to become community airlines. At the same 
time, it is worth considering how airlines and 
consumers alike can shape the thinking process of 
governments in ASEAN. As Dy (2014: 24-27) had 
observed, there is a possibility that institutional 
arbitrage could even evolve into a stage where 
business interests and even middle-income 
consumers could have an impact on policymaking. 
For example, a group of investors from different 
ASEAN member states who pool resources in a 
brand new airline in another ASEAN member state 
may have a vested interest to see that the industry 
further liberalised in order to increase profits. Also, 
middle-income consumers may demand more 
aviation services than what government-protected 
legacy carriers can offer. The increase in pressure 
by industry players and consumers may eventually 
be enough to convince national governments that 
ASAM is actually in their national interest.  
 
The completion of ASAM is important for ASEAN 
because it also affects how the association engages 
its foreign partners as a bloc and not as single 
states. As discussed by Kassim and Stevens (2010: 
165-171), the EU’s own experience with 
encirclement by the United States in the 1980s had 
helped to catalyse the move towards the EU’s 
single aviation market, and these lessons as well as 
the possibility of encirclement should be in the 
minds of policymakers in ASEAN especially with 
the ongoing negotiations for an EU-ASEAN Open 
Skies Agreement (European Commission 2014). 
Since not all the bilateral ASAs share the same set 
of rules, it is therefore unsurprising that ASEAN 
member states might choose the level or rights 
they seek to acquire. On the European side, the EU 
may bypass the option of waiting for ASAM to be 
completed and instead engage in encirclement by 
negotiating with individual ASEAN member states 
for the execution of open skies agreements. The 
danger here is that ASEAN countries that have 
secured more rights from the EU may have the 
ability to divert traffic away from those with fewer 
rights, while EU airlines may take the opportunity 
to exploit the gaps in ASEAN’s disjointed aviation 
market by developing multiple hubs to serve 
Southeast Asian destinations (Dy 2014). This will 
certainly be very disadvantageous for ASEAN as 
passenger traffic would be bled away from their 
carriers. 
 
It may also be prudent for ASEAN member states 
to place less emphasis on the “ASEAN Way” or 
insist on taking care of their own interests first as 
there may be more to the ASAM than meets the 
eye. Instead, ASEAN member states should 
consider – be it through the leadership of a 
member state with moral suasion or through frank 
negotiations – that the creation of ASAM would be 
a win-win proposition. As Baumen and Ng (2012) 
argue, there will always be a scarcity of a particular 
skill and resource in some countries within a 
broader economic landscape, and there is a need 
for economic sectors in ASEAN to be fully 
integrated in order to establish productive 
complementariness. In the case of ASAM, ASEAN 
member states with a weak aviation industry and 
limited resources can agree to divert resources to 
industries it can fare better in. Here, countries 
would not compete to attract passenger traffic or 
freight, but rather, efficiently allocate air services 
to those destinations that can  benefit most from 
aviation services agreements with third parties 
such as the EU (Dy 2014: 25-26). Such liberalisation 
can benefit ASEAN not just in enhancing 
commercial aviation connectivity within Southeast 
Asia, but it can also prove to be a catalyst for the 
successful development of other sectors of the 
ASEAN Economic Community. 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is little doubt that the EU has brought about 
a revolution in European aviation by creating a 
highly integrated aviation services market. The 
discussion in this background brief has examined 
the policy approaches taken by the European 
Commission as well as the role of leadership by 
several EU member states in the liberalisation of 
the aviation services market. The three packages 
that were implemented between 1987 and 1992 
have imposed restrictions on government actions 
and interventions, thereby forcing the 
abandonment of protectionist policies and the 
shifting of policymaking focus from member states 
to the European Union level. The changes have 
also meant that in theory all European Airlines 
EUC Background Brief No. 15 
 
 15 
have the freedom to operate from and to any 
point in the EU, but in practice the single aviation 
market has benefitted the low-cost segment of the 
market more than legacy carriers. This is not to say 
the EU’s single aviation market and related sectors 
are complete – among the many policy issues that 
exist with regards to aviation, the Council and 
Commission have much work to do in the 
integration of the air traffic control networks in 
Europe, the efficient allocation of airport slots and 
the enhancing of passenger rights in the Union. 
 
ASEAN, on the other hand, is still grappling with 
the development of its own single aviation market. 
The 2009 Multilateral Agreement of Air Services 
(MAAS) and the 2010 Multilateral Agreement for 
the Full Liberalisation of Air Services (MAFLPAS) 
have been created by member states, but these 
only cover 3rd/4th/5th freedoms without 
addressing the need for 6th, 7th, 8th or 9th freedoms. 
The protectionist attitude by member states such 
as Indonesia has been a stumbling block towards 
the completion of ASAM. Furthermore, the rush by 
ASEAN and member states to complete external 
connectivity before working on its own internal 
market raises questions on whether too much is 
being ceded to external third parties. For example, 
Chinese airlines will benefit more from an ASEAN-
China ASA than Southeast Asian carriers. In order 
to grow and thrive in a disjointed ASEAN aviation 
services market, some of these carriers have even 
resorted to institutional arbitrage so that they may 
set up hubs in different ASEAN member states. 
Unlike their counterparts in the EU which has the 
right to establish bases as community airlines, 
aviation operations within ASEAN require extra 
inconvenient steps for these airlines. 
 
The most important lesson that ASEAN member 
states can learn is that the establishment of a 
common market is advantageous for everyone. 
With the EU serious in its intent to conclude an 
open skies agreement with ASEAN, a Southeast 
Asian aviation market divided by protectionist 
sentiment will only weaken ASEAN carriers at the 
expense of European ones – as the EU had learnt 
two decades ago, encirclement by external parties 
has the potential to harm the long-term potential 
of an aviation market.  Large countries such as 
Indonesia and the Philippines are keys to ASEAN’s 
long term success, and it is up to member states to 
take up the leadership mantle and persuade their 
skeptical counterparts that the benefits of 7th, 8th 
and 9th freedoms can bring more benefits to the 
bloc. ASEAN airlines such as AirAsia may also have 
a role in persuading governments to change tact 
even as they continue to engage in institutional 
arbitrage. After all, in the long term, the opening of 
markets to each member states’ airlines and 
relaxing ownership rules will only serve the 
interests of ASEAN and its people and catalyzed 
genuine ASEAN connectivity and further 
integration in the region. 
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